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Abstract  
 
In the last couple of years, a broad range of regulatory initiatives with regard to company 
law and corporate governance has been taken by the Commission. These efforts, we shall 
argue, mark both a continuation – with respect to some of the issues involved – and a 
fundamental break – regarding both form and content – with earlier attempts at company 
law harmonization within the European Community. This transformation of corporate 
governance regulation at EU-level may be seen as a reflection and at the same time as an 
important cause of a broader, transnational transformation of corporate governance 
regulation in the European political economy. This paper argues that the EU has not only 
increased its attention to corporate governance regulation, but that, in terms of its content, 
the European approach to regulating the governance of corporations has shifted from a 
focus on harmonization, aimed at the prevention of regulatory competition, to a focus on 
promoting the marketization of corporate control, in part making use of market-based 
regulatory mechanisms.  
This shift cannot be simply explained either as a result of exogenous globalization 
pressures or as response to the recent wave of corporate scandals, but has to be interpreted 
as bound up with a coherent transnational political project constructed from the late 1980s 
onwards. This project can be understood both more broadly as a neoliberal project aimed at 
the marketization of the European socio-economic order in general – that is, promoting the 
market mechanism as the organizing principle (Polanyi 1957) of this order – and more 
narrowly, as a project aimed at the marketization of corporate control. As this papers 
argues, the latter has been increasingly articulated with, and made an integral part of, 
Europe’s strategy for creating a single financial market. 
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The Transformation of Corporate Governance Regulation in the European Union: 
From Harmonization to Marketization 
 
The virtual unification of national company laws in all essential aspects […] is a 
deliberate act of policy on the part of the Community. In fact, it is a political act 
necessitated by the desire to accomplish the aims of the Community 
(Schmitthof 1973: 89) 
 
The responsibility of the regulator is to set up the framework, which then enables 
the markets to play their disciplining role in an efficient way 
(Bolkestein 2003a) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance regulation forms an integral part of the socio-economic configuration 
of the European Union (EU). Within the EU, national corporate governance regulation has 
developed along trajectories of path-dependence and institutional complementarities (see 
Hall and Soskice 2001). Yet while institutional diversity remains considerable, there have 
been far-reaching and fundamental changes in the Member States’ approaches to corporate 
governance regulation. At the same time, with the progression of market integration in the 
EU, the regulation of corporate governance at the European level has become more 
significant both in scope and in impact on national systems. In particular over the past five 
years or so, a broad range of regulatory initiatives with regard to company law and 
corporate governance has been taken by the Commission. These efforts, we shall argue, 
mark both a continuation – with respect to some of the issues involved – and a fundamental 
break – regarding both form and content – with earlier attempts at company law 
harmonization within the European Community (EC). This transformation of corporate 
governance regulation at EU-level, then, may be seen as a reflection and at the same time as 
an important cause of a broader, transnational transformation of corporate governance 
regulation in the European political economy. Indeed, the argument that the European 
integration process is a significant driving force of changes in national regimes of corporate 
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governance is well established in the literature (Story and Walter 1997, Rhodes and Van 
Apeldoorn 1998, Lannoo 1999, Bieling and Steinhilber 2002).  
 
Given the obvious importance of corporate governance regulation at the EU level, it is 
somewhat surprizing that thus far little attention has been given to the nature and origins of 
this emerging European regulatory framework (but see Bieling and Steinhilber 2002 for an 
important partial exception). With regard to its nature, most analyses remain limited to the 
question whether or not current changes imply a convergence of the Rhenish national 
varieties of capitalism on the so-called Anglo--Saxon model (Albert 1993, Hall and Soskice 
2001), or whether we are witnessing a new, ‘hybrid’ form of European corporate 
governance (Cernat 2004, Rebérioux 2002). Although this is an important debate, it tends 
to bypass a more thorough understanding of the nature of the European project itself, in 
particular of its specific socio-economic and political content. This is all the more the case 
since, to the extent that an attempt is made to explain changing corporate governance 
regulation, whether at the EU or at the national level, it is seen as due to exogenous 
pressures stemming from ‘globalization’ in general, and recent corporate scandals in 
particular (Lannoo 1999, Lannoo and Khachaturyan 2003). What this argument ignores, we 
suggest, is the fundamentally political and ideological nature of the regulatory initiatives on 
the part of EU pertaining to corporate governance. 
 
This chapter seeks to set a first step towards filling these lacunae in the literature by moving 
beyond the ‘convergence debate’, outlining and interpreting the development of and 
changes in corporate governance regulation at the EU-level, and by showing that they in 
fact constitute part of a broader political project of socio-economic restructuring in the 
European Union. This perspective acknowledges the political underpinnings of the changes 
in corporate governance regulation, rather than merely perceiving them as inevitable results 
of reactive processes. Analyzing, then, what we see as the pro-active nature of the EU’s 
efforts to create a regulatory framework for European corporate governance, and analyzing 
the political trajectory of the policy and regulatory developments preceding these recent 
initiatives, will provide a more thorough understanding of how and why the regulatory 
framework is evolving the way it does. The analysis thus undertaken will show that we 
have witnessed a shift from a regulatory approach aimed at the harmonization of company 
 5
law in order to prevent regulatory competition in this area to a regulatory framework aimed 
increasingly at the establishment of a market-oriented corporate governance regime, in part 
through promoting market-based forms of regulation (compare the case of competition 
policy as analyzed in Wigger’s contribution to this volume). 
 
The central argument we put forward is thus that the social purpose of EU corporate 
governance regulation has changed. We view this changing social purpose in terms of a 
transnational European political project aimed at a fundamental socio-economic 
restructuring of European capitalism. In essence, this project can be described as a 
neoliberal marketization project, which, in the area of corporate governance, is aimed at 
turning (pieces of) corporations into commodities freely sold on an integrated capital 
market, which can thus effectively discipline both management and workers in terms of 
orienting them to the maximization of so-called investor returns. This marketization project 
is neither caused by an exogenous globalization process nor by the obvious superiority of 
market-based corporate governance (cf. Hansman and Kraakman 2001), but rather must be 
understood in terms of the outcome of political contestation in what Gramsci (1971) called 
the realm of hegemony. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief outline of the 
theoretical framework guiding our interpretation of the changes in corporate governance 
regulation. While on the one hand drawing on Polanyi and critical political economy 
approaches to the issue of corporate governance, and what we interpret as the marketization 
of corporate control, we also turn to a neo-Gramscian understanding of the process of 
European integration as a political project of socio-economic restructuring. Adopting this 
perspective, the main body of this chapter then comprises a delineation and interpretation of 
key developments in European corporate governance regulation in the last decades. Taking 
as a starting point the initial attempts by the European Commission to harmonize European 
company law, we show how this approach has fundamentally changed in later years, with 
the launch of the neoliberal integration project through the completion of the Single 
European Market and, most of all, its blueprint for financial market liberalization, the 
Financial Services Action Programme (FSAP). A prime example of how the underlying 
principles and rationale of the regulatory framework for corporate governance are 
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reoriented to the interests of transnationally mobile ‘investors’, is here formed by the 
Takeover Directive. As part of this shift, company law is increasingly subordinated to the 
wider objectives of financial market integration and thus to capital market law. This also 
transpires from the Corporate Governance Action Plan, published by the Commission in 
2003, which will provide the framework for an analysis of some other key recent 
developments and initiatives in corporate governance regulation. The conclusion we draw 
from this analysis is that these developments indeed constitute a political project, aimed at 
the marketization of European corporate governance.  
 
 
 
 
MARKETIZATION AS A POLITICAL PROJECT 
 
The European regulatory framework pertaining to corporate governance currently taking 
shape is in our view aimed at the m`arketization of corporate control’, which we define as: 
a` process through which who controls the corporation and to what purpose it is run 
becomes increasingly mediated by the stock market, that is, through the share price as the 
regulative mechanism’ (Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2006). The issue of corporate control – 
which came into being with the modern corporation or joint-stock company – is in fact at 
the heart of what has now come to be known as corporate governance. In fact, it goes to the 
heart of the debate on the nature of capitalism inasmuch as private ownership and therefore 
control over the means of production can be seen as the defining feature of a capitalist 
market economy. The debate on corporate control goes back at least to Berle and Means 
who in their classic study Modern Corporation and Private Property (Berle and Means 
1991 [1932]) advanced the thesis that with the rise of the modern corporation, or joint-stock 
company, ownership has been separated from control as the former had come into the 
hands of countless small shareholders unable to overcome their collective action problems, 
and control shifted to a new class of professional managers (see also Burnham 1975 [1941], 
Chandler 1977, Dahrendorf 1959). 
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In the ubiquitous neoclassical economics understanding, corporate governance serves as a 
mechanism to mitigate the agency costs arising from this alleged separation of ownership 
and control. The firm or corporation is seen as a ‘nexus of treaties’ (Jensen and Meckling 
1976: 8) between rational agents in which shareholders have the contractual right to 
residual profits, and, accordingly, the control rights over the way the corporation is run. 
Here, the m`arket for corporate control’ serves as the external corporate governance 
mechanism par excellence to ensure the protection of shareholder interests, by aligning 
managerial strategies with the latter (Jensen 1993). It is a market in which control over a 
corporation (in the sense of a majority of vote-carrying securities) can be bought through a 
variety of methods, ranging from open market purchases to negotiated share swaps 
(Bittlingmayer 1998). Analytically a distinction can be made between capital markets and 
markets for corporate control (Höpner 2003b: 104 ff). In practice, however, the two largely 
overlap (Windolf 1994). We argue that capital markets and markets for corporate control, 
whereby the development of the former is also a necessary condition for the emergence of 
the latter, together form an integral part of the m`arketization of corporate control’. 
Marketization here has to be understood to mean that the market-based mode of control, 
that is, control by ‘outsiders’ who are mobile and can ‘vote with their feet’ by selling their 
shares, is being strengthened. Shares then become property titles that not only give the right 
to a dividend but also to (potential) control over a firm‘s governance. In the market for 
corporate control, the firm as a whole becomes a commodity (Windolf 1994: 90). The 
marketization of corporate control thus puts the firm, its management, and workers more 
firmly under the discipline of the capital markets. 
 
The share price thus becomes a disciplinary device vis-à-vis management inasmuch as 
‘[t]he lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, 
the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe that they can manage the 
company more efficiently’ (Manne 1965: 113). The evaluation of company performance 
takes place purely on financial criteria - any technical or structural barriers to takeovers are 
thus perceived as detrimental to shareholder interests, and to undermine the efficient 
allocation of capital. Since shareholders allegedly value ‘good corporate governance’ at a 
premium (McKinsey 2002), it is assumed that in a functioning market there will be a 
‘natural’ process towards the corporate governance system which brings about the most 
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‘shareholder value’ (Hansman and Kraakman 2001). Public intervention in corporate 
governance systems is only tolerated where it serves to ease market failures. Any further 
public involvement potentially leads to market distortions in the assumedly apolitical 
market equilibrium, since regulation is perceived as captured by specific interests (Jensen 
1988: 45). 
 
Although we share the emphasis of the neo-classical perspective on the market for 
corporate control as critical to what can be called an exit (and hence market-) based system 
of corporate governance (see also Nooteboom 1999), we reject its normative commitment 
to this model, that is, the way, the disciplining of management by liquid capital markets is 
presented as a ‘natural’ and rational solution to the so called agency problem. We reject this 
discursive move as it presupposes the very fact that needs to be explained, which is that the 
shareholder is seen as sovereign with respect to the (control over the) firm. Here, corporate 
governance is thus reduced to the problem of ‘how investors get the managers to give them 
back their money’ (Shleifer and Vishny 1996: 4). In our view, such a definition of the 
problem reflects a particular conception of the firm, and is as such highly political and 
ideological. Furthermore, and, critical with respect to the current analysis, the extent to 
which that conception can be put in practice must be seen as dependent on a prior 
regulatory framework. The latter in turn requires a political explanation  
 
Our point of departure here is a Polanyian understanding of markets as political and social 
constructs (Polanyi 1957, cf. Fligstein 2001). Thus, in contrast to the tendency of neo-
classical agency theory to view regulation as intervening in the efficient allocation of 
capital through the market, we stress here the indispensability of public regulation in 
establishing this market (that is, a well-functioning capital market and a market for 
corporate control) in the first place. Markets do not create themselves, nor are they the 
spontaneous outcome of man’s allegedly innate entrepreneurial habits. Rather, they are 
created through the state, which needs to establish the necessary pre-conditions – such as 
the alienability of certain objects, that is, their capacity to be sold on the market and thus 
function as commodities; secure property rights; money as a medium of exchange and a 
sufficient degree of competition – for markets to emerge and develop (for a further 
conceptualization and analysis of these pre-conditions see Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2006.). 
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Drawing on Polanyi’s insight that markets are always embedded in a societal context, and 
that the perception that the capitalist mode of production, and the capitalist market system, 
function outside society and provide a space for organizing economic life without any 
interference of social forces thus constitutes a ‘stark utopia’ (Polanyi 1957: 3), we argue 
that changes in corporate governance are by no means inevitable processes driven by 
apolitical market forces. Rather, as markets are always social and political constructs, the 
current marketization of corporate control must be understood in terms of a p`olitical 
project’. Below we will apply this notion to the European arena and outline how we may 
theorize such a project within an EU context.  
 
The European marketization project 
 
Adopting a neo-Gramscian perspective, and applied to the European arena, we define a 
political project as an integrated set of ‘initiatives and propositions that, as pragmatic 
responses to concrete national and European problems, conceptually and strategically 
further the process of socio-economic, societal and institutional restructuring’ (Bieling and 
Steinhilber 2002: 41, our translation). As indicated in the introduction, within Europe it is 
no longer the national states that exclusively provide the regulatory framework of corporate 
governance – rather, increasingly, a key role here is played by the EU and by the process of 
European integration. In analyzing this role we adopt a transnational perspective (Van 
Apeldoorn 2002, 2004a) in which the institutional intergovernmental and supranational 
governance structures of the European multi-level polity are seen as embedded within a 
transnational political economy and a transnational civil society (see also Van Apeldoorn, 
Overbeek and Ryner 2003). Such a political project reflects the agency of a dominant set of 
transnational social and political forces. Concretely, a political project is articulated 
ideologically through the discursive and political practices of a multitude of (transnational) 
associations, lobby groups, think tanks, private forums and planning groups, and, as we 
shall see, in the case of corporate governance regulation, increasingly so-called ‘expert 
groups’, experts who are far from autonomous (inasmuch as such a thing exists) but are 
often directly linked to concrete (transnational) social forces. Through the transnational 
networks constituted by these actors (cf. Nölke 2003) certain interests are brought to the 
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fore and come to underpin the EU’s policy discourse and shape the content of the 
regulatory framework it seeks to put in place.  
 
From this perspective, then, the European Commission, although indeed an important 
supranational public actor, whose role as policy-entrepreneur is also very much confirmed 
by our case of European corporate governance regulation, must not be interpreted as an 
autonomous actor in the way some ‘supranationalist’ accounts of European integration tend 
to do (e.g., Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Rather, the Commission can arguably be 
viewed as a key public actor within the EU as a ‘multi-level state formation’ (Jessop 2002a: 
205, cf. Caporaso 1996), and as such embedded in a particular configuration of 
transnational social forces, and a concomitant (potentially hegemonic) construction and 
articulation of interests.  
 
In capitalist societies generally, it is of course capitalist interests that are privileged through 
these processes. In the current European Union as a system of asymmetric socio-economic 
governance establishing a ‘free space for capital’ (Van der Pijl 2006: 32) it is in particular 
those interests bound up with the most transnationally mobile fractions of capital that are 
privileged (see also Van Apeldoorn 2002). At the same time this emphasis on the structural 
primacy of transnational capital must not be taken to imply that political projects, 
notwithstanding their presentation as coherent programmes, are free from contradictions 
and therefore uncontested. Hegemony in a Gramscian sense is in fact never complete, and 
subordinate groups and classes may always struggle to redefine the terms of the dominant 
discourse and transform underlying social practices.  
 
We thus claim that a critical role, both directly and indirectly, is played by the process of 
European integration, which, in our view, since the end of the 1980s has been driven by a 
broader (neoliberal) marketization project, of which the project of a marketization of 
corporate control must be seen as part and parcel. We do not, however, claim that the 
regulatory changes with regard to corporate governance exclusively emanate from the EU. 
Rather, this regulatory transformation must be viewed as a transnational process where 
changes take place simultaneously at different levels. What we see as a project of market 
liberalization at the EU level here is both an expression and a constituting force of this 
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transnational process. In this sense many of the recent regulatory changes on the national 
level can only be understood in the context of the European integration process. 
 
Yet at the same time, the European project of market liberalization can only be understood 
against the backdrop of a global capitalist restructuring process that has taken place since 
the 1970s and that has engendered a deepening of the transnationalization of capital. 
Focusing on financial liberalization in particular, the European drive to integrate capital 
markets only makes sense in a global context. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
was accompanied by a worldwide financial deregulation wave in which finance became 
once more detached from the real economy and liquid capital gained a new transnational 
mobility and hence exit power. The globalization of capital markets, in conjunction with 
the globalization of product markets, leads to a competition between firms to suit the 
interests of transnationally mobile investors (Jackson 1998, Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 
1998: 413). Although crucial as a context, globalization or global restructuring is at the 
same time also partly constituted by the European regionalization process, and the political 
choices made therein.  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – 
ANALYZING AN EMERGENT PROJECT 
 
In this section, developments in corporate governance regulation and company law in the 
European Union are delineated and contextualized. We argue that a shift has taken place 
from a regulatory regime aimed at the harmonization of company law – with corporate 
governance still perceived as mainly a policy issue pertaining to company law – through 
public intervention and regulatory practices, to an increasingly market-regulated and 
market-based corporate governance system, the goals of which are defined in terms of 
financial efficiency and competitiveness.  
 
Harmonizing European company law  
 
There seems to be a consensus in the (political economy) literature that, as for instance 
Dewing and Russell state, ‘until relatively recently, the EC had not concerned itself with 
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corporate governance issues’ (Dewing and Russell 2004: 299). This perception might hold 
true when taking corporate governance as the comprehensive and interdisciplinary concept 
as it is used today, pertaining to securities as well as company law, to business and 
management studies as well as to political economy. Yet it can be argued that this 
perspective on corporate governance is itself a result of changes in the socio-economic 
configuration of capitalist market systems, inasmuch as corporate governance practices and 
regulation shape and in turn are shaped by changing conceptions of the role of the firm and 
how, and to which purpose, it should be run.  
 
We argue that corporate governance issues have in fact been part of the European market 
integration process from an early stage on, albeit in a narrower sense than in the recent 
discussions. The Commission’s attempt at harmonizing company law in the 1970s and 
early 1980s represents an early key development in this regard. As the Commission points 
out in the Corporate Governance Action Plan of 2003, most of the initiatives taken at EU 
level in the area of company law have been based on Article 44 (2) g (ex 54) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. Accordingly, the freedom of establishment within 
the EU is to be guaranteed ‘by co-ordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, 
for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of 
companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48 (ex 54), with 
a view to making such safeguarding equivalent throughout the Community’ (European 
Commission 2003: 6, see also Wouters 2000). The first harmonization directive in the field 
of European company law was adopted in 1968 (Wouters 2000: 257), and until 1989 a total 
of nine directives and one regulation pertaining to the harmonization of company law were 
enacted (European Commission 2003: Appendix). Among the initiatives promoted by the 
Commission were proposals for a Takeover Directive and the European Company Statute. 
As the Commission argued, the harmonization of company law was strongly conducive to 
the further integration of European markets. ‘Unity of law would not only promote 
integration, but would also give enterprises easier access to foreign capital markets, […] 
and to acquire an interest in or merge with enterprises from other Member States’ 
(European Commission 1965: 106).  
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At the same time, the regulatory focus within the company law harmonization strategy was 
aimed at avoiding regulatory competition (Wouters 2000: 282). In a then authoritative 
textbook on European company law, it is argued that ‘unless the national company laws in 
the Community are identical in all aspects, a movement of companies to the state with the 
laxest company law will take place in the Community. If it may be said without giving 
offence to our friends in the USA, t`he Community cannot tolerate the establishment of a 
Delaware in its territory’ (Schmitthoff 1973: 9). The fear of a ‘European Delaware’, in this 
regard, referred to the (re)incorporation of companies in Member States where company 
law provisions stipulated lower capital requirements and shareholder and creditor 
protection in general. To avoid the erosion of company law standards, and to achieve 
harmonization of company law, substantive regulation through legislative instruments was 
thus deemed necessary. To this end, the culinary strategy of the ‘salami tactics’ was to be 
employed, according to which: 
 
one slice of national company laws after the other will be harmonized, uniform 
minimum standards will be established in the national company laws of the 
Community with respect to all important areas. As these minimum requirements 
will be fairly detailed, what is taking place under the guise of harmonization is in 
fact a virtual unification of national company laws, leaving to different national 
regulation only unimportant matters of detail (Schmitthoff 1973: 7).  
 
Yet while the harmonization of company law progressed in the 1970s, the process came to 
a grinding halt in the 1980s. As Lanoo and Katchaturyan (2003: 5) argue, ‘the more they 
tried to harmonize corporate governance the less successful they were’ (see also Wouters 
2000: 271). In the 1985 White Paper, the Commission argued that the regulatory strategy 
‘totally based on harmonization would be over-regulatory, would take a long time to 
implement, would be inflexible and could stifle innovation’ (European Commission 1985: 
18). Harmonization, it argued, should rather be substituted by mutual recognition of 
national regulations and company laws, based on competition (in the sense of regulatory 
arbitrage by firms) as a mechanism for convergence rather than centralized top-down 
regulation.  
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Concomitant to a broader political struggle over the direction and aims of European 
integration (see Van Apeldoorn 2002), the strict harmonization approach to company law 
(and thus to corporate governance) was abandoned due to mounting intergovernmental 
contestation. The further harmonization had advanced, the more Member States realized 
how integral their national corporate governance configuration was to their national socio-
economic system. Member States’ concerns against and contestation of the harmonization 
approach, and the Commission’s changing strategy have thus led to an approach to 
corporate governance regulation favouring mutual recognition over centralized 
coordination. As Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn argue: 
  
One of the reasons for the acknowledgement of subsidiarity at Maastricht was the 
battle waged in the 1980s and early 1990s over attempts to introduce a uniform 
system of corporate governance. Harmonization had been advocated from various 
quarters, but in fact the directives regulating European corporate space have either 
been blocked by national disagreements over surrendering national sovereignty or 
have been issued in a form that allows a degree of national diversity (Rhodes and 
Van Apeldoorn 1998: 422) 
 
At the same time, increased transnationalization of business, and in particular an 
unprecedented increase in takeover activities in Europe in the late 1980s, led to a surge in 
public attention to corporate governance issues (Skog 2002: 302). Corporate governance 
regulation became more and more an issue of political contestation within the process of 
European integration. What explains this rising salience? Some downplay the role of the 
EU as such, by arguing, as Wouters for instance does, that ‘unlike the 1960s and 1970s, the 
impetus for new company law no longer comes from Brussels, but from the practical needs 
in the Member States, and – particularly as far as corporate governance is concerned – from 
the globalization of financial markets’ (Wouters 2000: 306). Yet as we would maintain, 
explaining the changing trajectory of corporate governance regulation on the basis of 
pressures emanating from the ‘globalization’ of financial markets means to ignore the role 
of political agency at the European level in ‘translating’ and formulating these (perceived) 
pressures into a regulatory framework. Here, the role of the Commission has been crucial 
for the re-orientation of corporate governance regulation. 
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Rather than advocating a ‘positive’ harmonization approach, the Commission’s approach 
has become increasingly based on identifying and subsequently eliminating obstacles to the 
free movement of companies and capital. Whereas corporate control used to be very much 
located in the domain of company law, subject to ‘positive’ harmonization, it has become 
increasingly regulated under aspects of capital and financial markets law. In the next 
section, then, the shift of corporate governance regulation as a subfield of company law 
towards the regulatory overlap between, on the one hand, securities and financial market 
law, and corporate governance and company law on the other, will be examined.  
 
Framing Corporate Governance Regulation – the Financial Services Action Plan  
 
Financial market integration has been an integral part of the single market programme from 
the start. The speed with which financial market integration was implemented was at first 
rather impressive, helped along by the ‘Europhoria’ in the second half of the 1980s. 
However, it was only in the second half of the 1990s that the attempt to create an integrated 
European financial market really picked up speed and developed into a core project of 
European socio-economic governance (see also Bieling 2003). This next phase of the EU’s 
drive to deepen financial market integration must be seen against the background of the 
following four factors. First, in spite of the earlier progress made, the integration of 
European capital markets was far from complete (Story and Walter 1997). Second, at the 
same time, the creation of EMU, the success of which was far from certain at the time, was 
expected to deepen capital market integration provided the right regulatory environment 
was put in place (see also Bieling and Steinhilber 2002: 48-9), and thus served as an 
impetus to further financial market integration. The single currency was expected to lower 
the transaction costs for cross-border trade in stocks and bonds and thus to lead investors to 
diversify their portfolios across the Eurozone, promoting the development of a pan-
European capital market (Lannoo 1999; OECD 1998). Third, those neoliberal forces that 
sought to advance this market liberalization project first needed to overcome the crisis of 
confidence in the relaunched European integration process that beset the Community in the 
early 1990s in the context of an economic recession and the troubles regarding the 
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ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, as well as growing social unrest in the face of rising 
mass unemployment (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 161ff, Bieling and Steinhilber 2002: 45). 
 
Finally, and most importantly, the neoliberal project itself needed to be consolidated – 
reinforcing its societal consent – before financial market integration could be further 
advanced. Although the neoliberal discourse had been shaping European policy debates 
from the 1980s onwards, it was only in the second half of the 1990s that the neoliberal 
project fully took shape and rose towards hegemony, at least at the level of the European 
elite discourse (Bieling and Steinhilber 2002: 43). As Van Apeldoorn (2002) has argued, 
the neoliberal project first needed to neutralize the challenges posed by contending 
transnational projects, in particular that of a supranational social democracy as promoted by 
the Delors Commission, and a neo-mercantilist project promoted by those sections of 
European industry that wanted to use the internal market as a protected home market in the 
face of growing global competition. In contrast, the neoliberal project put the emphasis on 
enhancing the (micro-economic) efficiency of European industry through market 
liberalization in the context of a globalizing European economy.  
 
At the discursive level, the ascendancy of this neoliberal project, and thus its (temporary) 
triumph over rival conceptions of the relaunched integration took place through a shift – 
effectuated in part through the transnational class agency of the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERT) – from a n`eo-mercantilist’ ‘competitiveness discourse’ advocating a 
strengthening of European industry through non-market means in order to enable it to better 
withstand the forces of global competition to a neoliberal competitiveness discourse in 
which competitiveness is precisely seen as benefiting from an unprotected exposure to 
global competition, in product as well as in capital markets (see Van Apeldoorn 2002: 
173—80, also Van Apeldoorn 2003). In this discourse, then, – which effectively neutralized 
the opposition of alternative projects through the ideological appeal of the goal of 
competitiveness itself (an objective shared by social-democrats, neo-mercantilist and 
neoliberals alike) – globalization is constructed as an inevitable reality against which one 
cannot and should not (wish to) protect oneself but as a challenge that need to be 
confronted head on through an ongoing process market liberalization allegedly necessary to 
enhance competitiveness in the face of global competition. Complying with the perceived 
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needs of global markets has hence become the primary goal of European socio-economic 
governance. What Watson and Hay (2003) have called ‘rendering the contingent 
necessary’, the Commission has thus increasingly come to legitimate its project in terms of 
promoting competitiveness defined in neoliberal terms. 
 
In this context, a reinvigorated neoliberal project in the form of a number of new initiatives 
has been undertaken by the European Union to accelerate and complete the creation of the 
single financial market. This project started with the Cardiff Council of 1998, which called 
for the Commission to develop an action plan for removing the remaining obstacles to an 
integrated financial market (see Bieling and Steinhilber 2002). With this the Council 
followed a proposal from the Competitiveness Advisory Group (CAG), a transnational 
group of ‘experts’ and representatives from labour and above all from transnational 
business, which was created in 1995 following an initiative of the ERT (Van Apeldoorn 
2002: 175--6). The CAG, like the ERT (ERT 1998), argued that financial market 
integration not only promoted efficiency of resource allocation but also would enhance the 
flexibility and the competitiveness of the European economy (Bieling and Steinhilber 2002: 
49). These developments then led up to the Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) drawn up in 1999 (European Commission 1999b). This plan, which turned 
financial market integration into one of the EU’s top priorities, contained a blueprint for the 
realization of an integrated financial market by 2005, and has as its clearly defined rationale 
that ‘integrated capital markets would enhance pressures for a market- and competition-
oriented modernization of the whole mode of capitalist reproduction’ (Bieling 2003: 212).  
 
The FSAP also gave new impetus to the attempt to create a more market-driven European 
corporate governance regime. In fact, the latter was seen as an integral part of the former, 
that is, of the EU’s strategy for financial market liberalization. This framing of corporate 
governance within the FSAP constitutes an important shift in the EU approach to corporate 
governance regulation. Corporate governance issues are increasingly articulated in the 
discourse of financial integration rather than solely in company law terms. Thus, for 
instance, the Takeover Directive became part of the legislative programme contained in the 
FSAP and was deemed crucial to ‘facilitate the restructuring of the financial industry [..] 
and mark an important milestone in the emergence of an open market in EU corporate 
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ownership’ (European Commission 1999b). In other words, regulatory initiatives in the 
realm of corporate governance, also within what previously was rather narrowly conceived 
in terms of Europeanizing company law – like the Takeover Directive (see below) – were 
now discursively and politically integrated into a comprehensive plan for financial market 
integration. The latter goal moreover became clearly embedded within the ‘master’ policy 
discourse of neoliberal competitiveness.  
 
The following quote from the then internal market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein provides 
a good illustration of the way the Commission invokes this competitiveness discourse. 
Referring to the FSAP, and articulating financial market integration with the need to create 
a European shareholder capitalism, Bolkestein argued that: 
 
Without a fully integrated financial services and capital market in Europe we shall be 
unable to release the economic opportunities that will underpin the Union’s new 
competitiveness. Because the cost of capital will remain too high and the yields on 
assets unnecessarily low. The availability of pan-European risk capital will be sub-
optimal and the attractiveness of IPOs limited. (Bolkestein 2000). 
 
In other words, integrating financial markets is about ‘sufficiently rewarding’ holders of 
liquid assets. It is thus about redistribution from stakeholders to ‘shareholders’, though at 
the same time the claim is upheld that financial market integration ‘will lead to a higher 
quality of life for all European citizens. A large, more liquid capital market in Europe will 
create investment, more growth, more innovation, more jobs and higher incomes’ (ibidem). 
Similarly, Alexander Schaub, then Director General of the Commission’s Internal Market 
Directorate, stresses that: 
 
The growing importance of corporate governance on the political agenda is not just 
a response to the recent wave of scandals in the US and in Europe. First and 
foremost it is a key component of a strategy to boost business’ competitiveness and 
to foster efficiency in a modern economy (Schaub 2004, emphasis added). 
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We argue that by turning the establishment of a European regulatory framework for 
corporate governance into an integral part of its overall drive for the integration and 
liberalization of Europe’s capital markets, and articulating this discursively with the 
overarching goal of promoting European competitiveness in the face of globalization 
pressures, the Commission has both changed the social purpose of European corporate 
governance regulation and widened its basis for organizing consent for this project. This 
way, earlier regulatory initiatives that got stuck because of a lack of intergovernmental 
consensus, acquired a new impetus. Issues that previously proved too politically sensitive 
in some Member States were depoliticized, or rather re-articulated in a different political 
project that, however, was presented in apolitical terms, that is, as objectively necessary to 
boost European competitiveness.  
 
After being approved by the Council at critical the Lisbon summit of March 2000 (see 
below), the implementation of the project of the integration of European capital markets 
was further advanced – and, at the same time, depoliticized by turning it into a matter of 
seemingly apolitical, ‘technical’ regulation best left to experts – through the creation of 
another transnational ‘expert group’, the so called Committee of Wise Men (sic) on the 
regulation of European securities markets under the chairmanship of Belgian banker 
Alexandre Lamfalussy (Lamfalussy et al. 2000; see also Bieling 2003, Bieling and 
Steinhilber 2002).  
 
The Lisbon summit and the subsequent so-called Lisbon strategy, itself also marked 
another key step in the development of the EU’s marketization project, with financial 
market integration being a fundamental part of the comprehensive socio-economic agenda 
adopted in the Portuguese capital. The Lisbon strategy, proclaiming the goal for the 
European Union to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world by 2010’ (European Council 2000), articulates the goal of competitiveness 
with that of social cohesion, but in a way of making the latter subordinate to the exigencies 
of the former as defined by the neoliberal competitiveness discourse (see Van Apeldoorn 
2006). The Lisbon ‘reform process’ has recently come under much criticism because of the 
lack of progress with respect to its implementation. We maintain, however, that at the level 
of formulating an elite policy discourse and an integrated programme that can muster the 
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consent within European transnational civil society, and that can thus carry the project of 
neoliberal European socio-economic governance forward, Lisbon has been rather 
successful. Moreover, the implementation of the Lisbon agenda is not lagging equally 
behind in all areas. Thus in the spring of 2004, some 70 directives had been adopted under 
the Lisbon process, mainly in the area of the internal market. Although transposition of 
these directives has been lagging, most progress has in fact been made in the area of 
financial market integration under the heading of the FSAP (see European Commission 
2004a: 13; 2004b). As the Commission announced, nearly all legislative measures of the 
FSAP have been completed on time (European Commission 2004c); a first evaluation will 
soon be followed by an impact assessment of transposition and implementation. Thus, what 
Commissioner Bolkestein (2000) considered to be ‘the core of the Lisbon strategy’ remains 
intact. The promotion of market-driven corporate governance reform constitutes an 
increasingly central element of the Commission’s overall strategy towards (financial) 
market integration in the European arena.  
 
The takeover directive 
 
The Takeover Directive may serve as an illustration of how the framing of corporate 
governance regulation within the context of the FSAP has re-oriented policy. Although, 
formally, the Takeover Directive is a directive on company law and part of the company 
law harmonization process, ‘at the same time, it seeks to regulate an important element of 
the functioning of capital markets. Many features of the draft directive have been driven 
much more by capital market concepts than by company law thinking […] The reach of 
capital market law over subjects that traditionally fall within the realm of company law is 
expanding‘ (Winter 2004: 106). The directive seeks to regulate important elements of the 
functioning of capital markets, in particular the process of bidding for the majority or all of 
the shares of a listed company. 
 
The ‘never ending story’ (Skog 2002) of the Takeover Directive, that is, its legislative 
history, started back in the 1970s with the Commission’s plan to harmonize takeover 
regulation within the European Community.1 Various legislative initiatives by the 
Commissions stranded, until, in 1989, it published its first draft proposal for a Takeover 
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Directive. Following objections of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council, the 
Commission subjected the directive proposal to ‘a drastic shot of subsidiarity therapy’ 
(Wouters 2000:263). Whereas the Commission argued that the Directive would create a 
‘level playing field’ for takeover bids in the European Union, several Member States 
(notably Germany and Sweden) argued that, due to their national regulatory framework for 
corporate governance, implementation of the Directive would put them at a comparative 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other Member States’ regulations. The proposal that was eventually 
put to vote in the EP in 2001 contained several compromises and references to national 
regulatory exceptions, but was nonetheless rejected in a tied vote.  
 
After the defeat in Parliament, a High Level Group of Company Law Experts (HLG) - both 
from academia and business and chaired by Dutch company law professor and legal advisor 
for Unilever Jaap Winter - was installed by the Commission with the mandate to ‘point out 
a new direction for the future’ of European Company Law and Corporate Governance 
(Winter 2004: 98) and thus prepare the ground for a reformulation of the Takeover 
Directive that would be able to break the political deadlock.2 The Commission, in its 
subsequent 2002 Takeover Directive proposal (European Commission 2002c) and the 
ensuing Action Plan on Corporate Governance published in 2003 (European Commission 
2003a), followed most of the recommendations and issues raised by the HLG. Indeed, the 
role and influence of the HLG was far more extensive than just the provision of nitty-gritty 
company law expertise to figure out the very details of new proposals – rather, by setting 
policy options and recommendations in a framework which entailed a considerable shift 
towards a more market-based corporate governance regulation they significantly shaped the 
parameters of the corporate governance regulation debate in the European Union (see Horn 
forthcoming). Although the new proposal by the Commission again met considerable 
objections in the Council and the EP, a diluted form eventually passed in the EP, and the 
Takeover Directive came into force in May 2004. 
 
As the above brief account indicates, while it is important to acknowledge the 
intergovernmental dimension of the struggles over the Takeover Directive, including, 
indirectly, of the struggle taking place in the EP (cf. Callaghan and Höpner 2005), it is 
crucial to appreciate both the Commission’s role in pushing for the market-liberal content 
 22
of the Takeover Directive, as well as the role of transnational private ‘expert’ groups in 
providing the ‘epistemic’ underpinnings – that is, producing the discourse and ideas and 
concomitant concrete policy proposals – of the marketisation of corporate control that the 
Commission had been promoting since the 1990s. As such, the struggle over the Takeover 
Directive serves as an example of the political nature of the changes in European corporate 
governance regulation. While Member States increasingly seek to safeguard their interests 
with regard to national corporate governance regulation, the Commission’s objective is to 
create and promote international investment opportunities and market integration. It has 
repeatedly expressed its belief in the efficiency of the market for corporate control, or, as 
Frits Bolkestein put it, a market where ‘the good can take over and improve the bad’ 
(Bolkestein 2003b).  
 
As pointed out above, the final form of the Takeover Directive is characterized by a 
compromise that has watered down its original market-liberal content.3 Whereas the 
directive includes provisions on the neutrality of the board and the abolition of voting 
restrictions and multiple voting rights in the case of a takeover bid (Articles 9 and 11, 
respectively), Article 12 renders these potentially far-reaching provisions as optional. This 
means that Member States can decide whether they should be implemented when 
transposing the Takeover Directive into national law. This compromise form has led most 
observers to argue that the Takeover Directive was, as the Financial Times argued, 
toothless and ‘a missed opportunity for open markets’ (Dombey 2003). Arguably, however, 
the Takeover Directive, albeit not quite the far-reaching instrument for the marketization of 
European takeover regulation that the Commission envisaged, does in fact represent a 
stepping stone towards the further marketization of corporate control in the European arena 
(for a more elaborate account see Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2005). While it will only 
become clear after the full implementation of the directive in all Member States in how far 
the optional arrangements have actually been enforced,4 the Takeover Directive indeed 
includes a number of provisions that do not fall under the optional specifications, such as 
broad transparency and disclosure provisions and a mandatory bid rule to enforce 
(minority) shareholder protection. As Maul and Kouloridas argue, ‘transparency and 
disclosure is considered, beyond any doubt, as a cornerstone of the effective operation of 
capital markets and the market of corporate control’ (Maul and Kouloridas 2004). 
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Its significance notwithstanding, the Takeover Directive is nevertheless but one example of 
the developments in corporate governance regulation within the EU. In the following 
section, the Commission’s 2003 Corporate Governance Action Plan and several regulatory 
initiatives in its framework further illustrate the changes in regulatory orientation. They 
also serve to emphasize the political nature of the marketization project.  
 
Modernizing company law and enhancing corporate governance? The Company Law 
Action Plan 
 
The Commission’s 2003 Action Plan for ‘Modernizing company law and enhancing 
corporate governance’ is partly based on a report from the same group of company law 
experts that has played a critical role in the development of the Takeover Directive (High 
Level Group of Company Experts 2002). Klaus Hopt points out the ’close connection’ 
between the FSAP and the Company Law Action Plan: 
 
Mr. Bolkestein [Commissioner for the Internal Market] was highly successful with 
the former, but company law harmonization was unsuccessful for decades. 
Bolkestein’s ingenious idea was to link both fields and both regulatory schemes by 
using the experience with and the political success of the Financial Markets Action 
Plan for progress in company law. This was politically very skilful and has also 
worked out well legally and economically (Hopt 2005: 5)  
 
The Company Law Action Plan frames corporate governance reform in the same notions of 
competitiveness and efficiency that also underlie its agenda for capital market integration:  
 
A dynamic and flexible company law is essential for deepening the internal market 
and building an integrated European capital market. […] An effective approach will 
foster the global efficiency and competitiveness of business in the EU […] and will 
help to strengthen shareholder rights (European Commission 2003b).  
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As Bolkestein pointed out, the Commission sees itself in a key position for this reform 
agenda. ‘[O]ur challenge is to lead the debate in the European Union and beyond, and to 
adopt the right policy approaches to the different issues’ (Bolkestein 2004). The Company 
Law Action Plan is based on a comprehensive set of proposals on corporate governance, 
capital maintenance, corporate pyramid structures and other corporate governance related 
issues. Within the framework of this plan, two different objectives have to be distinguished. 
On the one hand, most of the short-term measures introduced in the Plan are indeed very 
much aimed at re-establishing investor confidence after corporate scandals such as 
Parmalat and Ahold. This is reflected in the short-term priorities – enhancing the quality 
and independence of audit,5 increasing the responsibility and independence of the board 
and making directors’ remuneration more transparent. On the other hand, the overarching 
objective of the Commission remains the strengthening of shareholder rights and the 
fostering of efficiency and competitiveness of business (European Commission 2003a). 
Rather than just containing measures to prevent other corporate scandals, the Company 
Law Action Plan has thus a far more fundamental purpose, in tune with the overall political 
project of European integration. (For an analysis of how these two objectives might be 
contradictory, as shareholder primacy has in fact been a cause of the corporate scandals 
rather than that it can be part of the solution, see the chapter by Rebérioux in this volume). 
As Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for the Internal Market, points out: 
 
The context in which we will set our priorities for the second phase is very different. 
The impetus for what we do next at EU level must now be the tandem of: 1) 
improving the competitiveness of EU companies – the so-called Lisbon agenda; and 
2) the EU’s push towards better regulation (MacCreevy 2005a).  
 
Although the Company Law Action Plan itself is not very concrete on medium- to long-
term measures (for an overview, see European Commission 2003a: 25-26), there is a whole 
range of initiatives already initiated within the broader framework of regulatory reform.6 
While the European Commission has repeatedly stated that it does not envisage a unified 
‘European code of corporate governance’ (MacCreevy 2005b), it appears to be confident 
about a trend towards convergence of national corporate governance codes: 
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Corporate governance practices vary among Member States because of their 
different economic, social and legal traditions. Nevertheless, there is a clear market-
driven trend towards convergence in Europe. […] Market participants, including 
investors, have every interest in taking the view that such convergence is vital for 
integration of our capital markets – and even for economic growth (MacCreevy 
2005b).  
 
Member States are expected to establish unified national corporate governance codes that 
their companies will be obliged to apply (Maul and Kolouridas 2004: 1293). To promote 
the discussion and, ultimately, dissemination of ‘best practice’ of these national codes, it 
has set up an expert group in 2004, the European Corporate Governance Forum. Next to 
academics (often with links to the corporate world, though), the membership of this forum 
is predominantly made up of representatives of Europe’s largest transnational corporations 
as well as, and even more so, representatives of financial capital (institutional investors; 
shareholder associations).7 A similar bias in terms of membership can be found in the 
Corporate Governance Advisory Group, which the Commission has set up to provide it 
with ‘technical advice’.8  
 
The transnational politics of the transformation of European corporate governance 
regulation 
 
As the above analysis shows, the Commission has been at the forefront of a number of EU-
level regulatory initiatives constituting a political project aimed at the marketization of 
corporate control. At the same time, the Commission’s push has been facilitated and 
encouraged by a transnational network of interests and private bodies, most visibly in the 
form of so-called expert groups, in which the experts, however, often have ties to, or 
directly represent the interests and ideas of European transnational, and predominantly 
financial, capital. Next to the powerful interests from which their members are drawn, the 
significant role of these transnational expert groups may also be understood – linking form 
and content – in the light of how in the push for a more market-driven European corporate 
governance regime they usefully depoliticize what in fact is deeply political, and therefore 
often prevent overt political conflict, or, as was the case with the Takeover Directive, break 
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the political deadlock over certain (potentially) contentious aspects of the marketization 
project.  
 
The ideational shift underlying the changes in company law and corporate governance 
regulation in the EU has thus in part taken place through the agency of these transnational 
expert groups (for a more detailed analysis see Horn forthcoming). While these expert 
groups, on the one hand, represent the Commission’s ambition - under the heading of the 
‘better regulation’ approach – to consult with ‘stakeholders’ on regulatory initiatives, they, 
on the other hand, (re)produce and consolidate the dominant discourse on market-driven 
regulation. The European Commission’s focus on facilitating cross-border transactions and 
the establishment of a truly integrated market to enhance the investment opportunities for 
transnationally mobile capital is partially instigated, and at the same time reinforced, by 
incorporation into the early phases of the regulatory process of these experts cum 
representatives of transnationally mobile capital (in particular, capital market actors). The 
Commission’s initiatives, to a large degree, articulate the discourse engendered and 
disseminated by such transnational networks. 
 
All in all, it appears that the Commission has indeed fully taken on a ‘negative 
harmonization’ approach to corporate governance regulation. Rather than insisting on 
concrete and definite regulatory coordination, it seeks to strengthen the position of 
shareholders, and ultimately the role of the market, by removing ‘technical’ obstacles such 
as multiple voting rights or facilitating cross-border transactions. The objective behind this 
is clearly that ‘in the medium to long term our actions must respond to the needs of the 
market (MacCreevy 2005b). Apart from the Commission’s push for a ‘shareholder 
democracy’ (European Commission 2005b), increased transparency and disclosure of 
corporate governance issues are supposed to advance the functioning of market control. As 
Frits Bolkestein argued: ‘disclosure elements are a highly effective market-led way of 
rapidly achieving results [..] better disclosure will help the markets to play their disciplining 
role’ (Bolkestein 2004). Within EU financial market and corporate governance regulation, 
several regulatory initiatives have been aimed at improving transparency and disclosure, 
most notably the 2003 Prospectus Directive (2003/71/European Commission) and the 2004 
Transparency Directive (2004/109/European Commission).  
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In the field of regulating corporate governance, the EU thus increasingly only intervenes 
and provides a regulatory framework in cases where the market cannot provide for the 
conditions necessary for its proper functioning, which means that regulatory activities are 
increasingly assigned to the market and thus further removed from democratic control. 
National regulatory arrangements of corporate organisation are subjected to the scrutiny of 
the market in an environment of increasing regulatory arbitrage. As Jaap Winter contends, 
‘the picture emerges that the original legislative approach to harmonize company laws in 
Europe, in order to avoid ‘bad’ competition between Member States, has been 
supplemented by a judicial approach explicitly allowing for competition between the 
company laws of Member States’ (Winter 2004: 107). From a market perspective, even 
regulation that might be considered ‘efficient’ in a national context ceases to be efficient if 
it does not provide for a basis for the further integration of a liquid transnational market. In 
the words of the High Level Group of Company Experts, ‘these more and less developed 
markets must be integrated on a European level to enable the restructuring of European 
industry and the integration of European securities markets to proceed with reasonable 
efficiency and speed’ (High Level Group of Company Experts 2002: 23). This means we 
are dealing with a process of transnational marketization, arguably disembedding the socio-
economic organization of the EU.  
 
CONCLUSION 
9In this chapter we have sought to show that the EU has not only increased its attention to 
corporate governance regulation, but that, in terms of its content, the European approach to 
regulating the governance of corporations has shifted from a focus on harmonization, aimed 
at the prevention of regulatory competition, to a focus on promoting the marketization of 
corporate control, in part making use of market-based regulatory mechanisms. We have 
argued that this shift cannot be simply explained either as a result of exogenous 
globalization pressures or as response to the recent wave of corporate scandals, but has to 
be interpreted as bound up with a coherent transnational political project constructed from 
the late 1980s onwards. This project can be understood both more broadly as a neoliberal 
project aimed at the marketization of the European socio-economic order in general – that 
is, promoting the market mechanism as the organizing principle (Polanyi 1957) of this 
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order – and more narrowly, as a project aimed at the marketization of corporate control. As 
we have seen, the latter has been increasingly articulated with, and made an integral part of, 
Europe’s strategy for creating a single financial market. 
 
The currently hegemonic neoliberal policy discourse, subjecting the governance of 
corporations to the discipline of capital markets, and ultimately turning corporations 
themselves into commodities, is supposed to enhance the global competitiveness of the 
European economy in general. In other words, increasing the exit power of transnationally 
mobile shareholders and ‘sufficiently’ rewarding these ‘investors’ for the risks they have 
taken (‘shareholder value’) is presented as necessary in order to let Europe survive in the 
globalized world economy. Elsewhere in this volume, several arguments have been 
advanced to cast considerable doubt on this kind of logic. Here we have mainly claimed 
that this kind of discourse shows the ideological underpinnings and political contingency of 
the EU’s attempt to create a European regulatory framework for corporate governance. At 
the same time, we have underlined the key role of EU regulation, and regulation in general, 
in constructing and promoting the development of markets. In as far as European corporate 
governance becomes more market-based and reveals some convergence among diverse 
national systems, this is not spontaneously brought about by market forces. Regulation, in 
providing the key pre-conditions for markets to arise and develop, is central here. The EU 
has set this task for itself with an impressive zeal. Paradoxically, as policy makers 
increasingly seek to ´leave things to the market´, the state, or in this case the multi-level 
polity of the EU, has to play an increasingly pro-active role in order to achieve this state of 
affairs. Partly for this reason the idea of a self-regulating market is ultimately, as Polanyi 
(1957) argued, a utopia. It is also a utopia because the destructive forces that the free 
market and its commodifying logic unleash will require a more protective role of the state 
as well, if the capitalist system is not to break down entirely. However, this part of the 
Polanyian ´double movement´ is as yet far from apparent at the level of EU socio-economic 
governance.  
                                                 
1
 For detailed accounts of the legislative history of the Takeover Directive, see e.g. Skog (2000); 
Berglöf and Burkart (2003); Wooldridge (2004).  
2
 For a list of members and published reports see 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/advisory/index_en.htm   
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3
 Directive 2004/25/EC of  21 April 2004 on takeover bids; for a detailed overview and discussion 
of the provisions see Maul and Kolouridas (2004); Wooldridge (2004) 
4
 Implementation of the Directive has been rather slow (see Buck 2006). For an overview of the 
implementation process and which Member States have followed the optional arrangements, see a 
study conducted by the European Group for Investor Protection, available at  
http://www.egip.org/docs/Updated%20version%20of%20EGIP%27s%20survey%20on%20the%20i
mplementation%20of%20the%20EU%20Takeover%20Directive.pdf (last accessed 11 September 
2006). 
5
 Agreement has recently been reached on the 8th company law directive on statutory audit 
(IP/05/1249). 
6
 The European Commission has recently conducted a consultation on the ‘future priorities’ of the 
Company Law Action Plan. For the report of the consultation, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/consultation/final_report_en.pdf (last accessed 
11 September 2006).  
7
 For the list of members see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/members_en.pdf (last accessed: 22 
September 2006).  
8
 See for information on the membership of this group and for its reports: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/advisory/index_en.htm (last accessed: 22 September 
2006). In terms of the composition of both these groups, it is remarkable that labor organisations are 
only represented by one member in each group. 
9
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